Revenue Incentives and Referee Propensity to Make Foul Calls in the NBA Finals by Fallon-Cyr, Daniel
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2017
Revenue Incentives and Referee Propensity to
Make Foul Calls in the NBA Finals
Daniel Fallon-Cyr
Claremont McKenna College
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fallon-Cyr, Daniel, "Revenue Incentives and Referee Propensity to Make Foul Calls in the NBA Finals" (2017). CMC Senior Theses.
1599.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1599
 
 
CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE 
 
 
REVENUE INCENTIVES AND REFEREE PROPENSITY 
TO MAKE FOUL CALLS IN THE NBA FINALS  
 
 
 
SUBMITTED TO 
PROFESSOR JANET K. SMITH 
 
BY  
DANIEL R. FALLON-CYR 
 
 
FOR 
SENIOR THESIS 
SPRING 2017 
APRIL 24TH, 2017
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I	
Acknowledgements 
 
 I would like to begin by thanking Professor Janet Smith. She was an immense 
help from the beginning. When my original thesis idea fell through at the last minute 
Professor Smith aided me in idea generation as well as idea critique. I cannot thank her 
enough for making herself more than accessible throughout the process of my thesis.  
I would also like to thank Professor Manfred Keil. It has been some time since I 
took his econometrics class my sophomore year, and I was in grave need of some 
assistance when working through my regressions. Professor Keil’s knowledge and 
wisdom benefited me greatly.  
Lastly, I would like to thank my parents Mark and Maureen, and my sister Raven. 
They have been the core of my support through college and the thesis process. Their love 
and curiosity about my work is what kept me going when the going got hard.  
The help and encouragement I received over the course of writing my thesis 
obviously extends far past the few names I have mentioned above. Thank to all of those 
who let me bounce ideas off of them, reminded me why I chose my topic in the first place, 
and laughed at my ridiculously sleep-deprived jokes in Poppa computer lab. It was quite 
the trip, but I’m happy to say I am proud of the work I accomplished. It would not have 
been possible without the love and support I needed to push me to the end.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 II	
Abstract 
 
In this study I examine foul calls by NBA referees alongside the difference in 
aggressiveness of twelve NBA basketball teams as they compete for the Championship 
Title. I aim to identify referee biases that increase the likelihood of the NBA Finals 
ending in a later game due to league revenue incentives. My data consists of 91 
individual NBA Finals games played between the 2001 and 2016 NBA Finals. After 
controlling for changes in play as well as the difference in aggressiveness, I find that 
NBA referee’s foul calls are more dependent on a call on the opposing team in situations 
with a larger series score spread. Additionally, I identify a consistent officiating bias 
towards the home team. My results imply an effort by the NBA to increase the 
probability of the series ending in a later game, possibly motivated by increased revenues 
for the league and all parties involved.  
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Introduction 
 
 On June 19th, 2016 the Cleveland Cavilers did the unthinkable, they came back 
from a (3,1) lag against the Golden State Warriors and won the 2016 National Basketball 
Association (NBA) Finals. A mere nine days before, the Warriors had just won their third 
game of the series, and they were a shoo-in for the victory. At that time Vegas was 
predicting a 1.2% chance of the Cavilers winning the series, a next to impossible feat. As 
I watched the seventh and final game of the series I could not help but notice all of the 
hype surrounding the event. Every other sentence from the announcer pertained to some 
record being broken whether it be ticket sales, viewership, ad pricing, all of the past sales 
records had been left in the dust.  
 The 2016 NBA Finals game seven was the third most watched game in NBA 
history peeking with almost 45 million viewers, and averaging 31 million viewers 
throughout the game. 1 Ticket sales skyrocketed after the Cavilers beat the Warriors in 
game six and sent the series to a deciding game seven. Courtside VIP seats for game 
seven were listed for $122,000 and average ticket prices jumped over $1000.2 As I 
watched the immense amount of money surround game seven, I could not help but think 
the NBA had some how made this happen. Had game five decided the series, the NBA 
and all parties involved would have missed out on potential revenues in excess of $100 
million.3 This thought sparked my interest in investigating whether or not the NBA was 
fixing games. After speaking with various friends who were knowledgeable and 
passionate about the NBA, I decided it was unlikely the NBA would directly fix games. 																																																								1	NBA	Communications,	2016	Finals	Summary	2	Tuttle,	Brad.	"NBA	Finals	Game	7	Ticket	Prices	Shoot	Up	an	Extra	$1,000."	3	Tuttle,	Brad.	"Here’s	How	Much	Money	ABC	&	the	NBA	Make	with	an	NBA	Finals	Game	7"	
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However, I still believed the NBA would do everything in their power to increase the 
likelihood of the Finals going to game seven. This led me to my investigation into referee 
biases in the NBA Finals.  
 Upon my review of previous literature on the subject I found various studies 
aiming to identify referee bias in the NBA as well as the NCAA. Anderson and Pierce 
(2009) examined foul calls in the NCAA and find referees will traditionally favor the 
lagging team as well as the home team. Their insights give direction for how to identify 
bias in basketball; however, the authors chose to examine regular season games opposed 
to post season games. A similar study by Price et al. (2012) assessed referee calls in the 
NBA, and aimed to identify a bias using discretionary and nondiscretionary turnovers. I 
find similar results to those found by Price et al. (2012), although, I use fouls as my 
measure of bias opposed to turnovers.  
 After deciding to examine foul calls by the referees, I had to establish how I 
expected to uncover the bias I believed was present. My advisor, who has done extensive 
work in tournament competition research, encouraged me to investigate how the 
aggressiveness of the two teams shifted throughout the series. Cabral (2003) and 
Ozbeklik and Smith (2014) both find that competitors in multi-period competitions vary 
in risk-taking behavior as well as effort exerted depending on their position in the 
standings. This led me to establish an aggressiveness metric to measure the difference in 
team’s aggressiveness as the series progressed.  
 My study builds on current literature pertaining to NBA referee biases, and also 
contributes to existing literature on competitor behavior in competition settings. Although 
my study relates directly to the NBA Finals, it offers an outline for identifying officiating 
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biases in a variety of tournament settings. My results shed light on what may be an effort 
by the NBA to increase the likelihood the Finals ending in a later series game due to 
revenue incentives, however, there still stands an immeasurable amount of work to 
ascertain such an effort.  
 
 
 
Background on the NBA Finals 
 
 The NBA Finals have been played after every NBA season since the NBA’s 
inception, beginning with the first Finals in 1947. The Finals consist of a seven game 
series in which the winners of the Eastern and Western Conference Finals compete for 
the Larry O’Brien Championship Trophy. The first team to win four games in the series 
emerges victorious. The current structure of the Finals is a 2-2-1-1-1 format in which the 
first two games are played at the home of the higher seeded team, then the following two 
games are played at the home of the lower seeded team, then the last three games 
alternate with the 5th and 7th games being played at the home of the higher seed, and the 
6th game at the home of the lower seed. 
 The Finals have been anything but consistent throughout their history. From name 
changes to structural changes, the finals have transformed along with the shifting board 
and commissioners. In 1984 David Stern took over control from Larry O’Brien as 
Commissioner of the NBA. One of the first changes he instituted as Commissioner was a 
structural change to the 1984-1985 NBA Finals. Stern argued, teams, as well as media, 
were caused unnecessary stress by the 2-2-1-1-1 format due to the requirement to fly 
back-and-fourth across the country to play the final games of the series. In order to ease 
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the burden on all parties involved, Stern changed the format of the Finals from the 
original 2-2-1-1-1 format to a 2-3-2 format. Although this change did ease stress on the 
players and media alike, many also argued it increased the likelihood of the series ending 
in a later game because it provided the lower seeded team with one additional home game 
before returning to the home court of the higher seeded team. The NBA continued with 
the new structure until 2013 when Adam Silver took the reins from Stern. Again with the 
shift in power, one of the first changes instituted was the shift back to the original 2-2-1-
1-1 format. Thus far the Finals have remained in their original format of 2-2-1-1-1, but 
the consistency of structure remains to be seen with future shifts in the administration.  
 Additionally, the NBA has also made recent changes to the instant replay rules. 
Instant reply was first introduced to the NBA in 2002; since then it has become 
instrumental in making calls, especially foul calls. After the reorganization of the NBA 
Competition Committee in 2012, the NBA began making major changes to the calling 
power allotted to the instant replay reviewers. For the 2012-2013 season the Competition 
Committee introduced extended use of reply, which allows referees to make flagrant foul 
calls after the game is over upon review of the game footage.4 Along with this change 
came several others allowing for more autonomy over calls, however, the rules also place 
more control in the hands of the reviewers allowing them to alter the outcome of a game 
even after it has finished.  
 The most recent change to the NBA Finals is a change to the playoff seeding. 
Originally, the top teams from each division of the NBA were guaranteed a top four seed 
in their respective conference playoffs. If the division winner did not have a better record 																																																								4	NBA	Communications,	NBA	Board	of	Governors	approves	expanded	use	of	replay	
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than their opponent then they lost home court advantage, but they maintained their seed. 
For the 2015-2016 season the NBA Board of Governors voted to do away with the 
guaranteed top four seed for the division winners, and shift to a playoff seeding structure 
based purely on record.5 This changes allowed for a higher likelihood of having the best 
teams in the finals, and in turn increase the overall probability the finals end in a later 
game.  
Background on NBA Finals Viewership & Revenues 
 
 In 2010 the NBA set records with their broadest Finals reach ever. The Finals 
were broadcast in 215 countries and territories in 41 languages.6 This marked the 
beginning of an NBA initiative to expand Finals viewership worldwide. After a 
successful 2010 season the NBA began investing in a variety of vehicles to expand 
viewership to stretches of the world that had never experienced the NBA. This 
investment included the ability to watch the Finals on NBA.com and NBA Mobile, and in 
2013 NBA Digital, the NBA’s multimedia conglomerate, set yet another record year. 
 After 2013 the NBA saw a market opportunity and began to build out their social 
media platform. Over the course of the next two years the NBA launched social media 
campaigns on: Facebook, Twitter, Google, Instagram, and Snapchat to gain user 
interaction. This investment paid off, and in 2015 the NBA shattered viewership records 
with an average 20 million viewers per Finals game. During the series NBA Digital 
delivered 336 million combined video views during the 2015 Finals. By the end of the 
																																																								5	NBA	Communications,	NBA	to	seed	conference	playoff	teams	by	record	6	NBA	Communications,	NBA	Finals:	Broadest	reach	ever	
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2015 Finals the NBA had 835 million combined social media followers after adding 250 
million over the course of the season.7  
 The 2016 season brought another record-breaking year with the culmination of 
the Finals. Game seven averaged 31 million viewers on ABC making it the third most 
watched NBA game of all time, and in China garnered 15.3 million unique viewers over 
all platforms making it the most watched NBA game in China’s history.8 The NBA also 
surpassed 1 billion social media followers making it the first sports league in the world to 
pass 1 billion followers.  
 
 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
 Average ticket prices for the 2016 NBA Finals shot up over $1000 when the 
Cleveland Cavilers won game six and pushed the series to a deciding game seven.9 There 
is no question that everyone benefits from the NBA Finals being pushed to an additional 
game. The fans get to watch a more intense match. The broadcasting agencies get to run 
more adds. The NBA gets to sell more merchandise and tickets. It is really a win-win for 
everyone. This is precisely the thought I had as I watched the Cleveland Cavilers win 
game six after coming back from a (3-1) lag in 2016. So, if everyone wins, why not push 
the series to a game seven? 
 Over the course of the 2015 NBA postseason 81 games were played between 16 
total teams. The Finals went to games six, but ended when the Golden State Warriors 
																																																								7	NBA	Communications,	NBA	Finals	2015	by	the	numbers	8	Historic	NBA	Finals	2016	set	TV,	Social,	Digital	and	merchandise	records	9	Tuttle,	Brad.	"NBA	Finals	Game	7	Ticket	Prices	Shoot	Up	an	Extra	$1,000."	
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beat the Cleveland Cavilers in game six. Ad sales from the 81 televised games combined 
to generate a whooping $613 million dollars in sales.10 AdAge, a prominent Ad statistics 
reporter, estimated that had there been a game seven ABC would have generated an 
additional $45 million in ad sales.11 This means that while game seven only makes up 
1.2% of the total games played, it generates over 7% of the total ad sales. Ad revenue is 
still only a portion of the total revenues received in the event of an extra Finals game. The 
NBA is also able to capitalize on additional merchandise sales, ticket sales, and in the 
event of a revenue sharing agreement with the broadcasting agency the excess ad 
revenues once the Finals achieve a certain ad sales benchmark.  
 Due to the possible revenues available at little to no cost I see no reason why the 
NBA would not be inclined to do everything in their power to increase the probability of 
a Finals game five, six, or seven. So, when considering ways the NBA could affect this 
probability I chose to focus on foul calls. After reviewing previous literature on the 
subject I found that competitors who are leading often exert less effort, and teams who 
are lagging exert more effort. This led me determine my first hypothesis:  
 
Teams lagging in the NBA Finals will exert more effort as the possibility of 
them losing increases, and teams who are leading in the NBA Finals will exert 
less effort as the possibility of them winning increases.  
 
 Next, I had to determine where I expected to see a bias in the referee’s calls. If the 
referees were incentivized to increase the probability of the Finals reaching a game five, 
six, or seven, then I would expect them to favor the lagging team. Naturally, if my first 
																																																								10	Crupi,	Anthony.	"With	the	Warriors	on	Fire,	NBA	Generates	Big	Bucks	for	TNT,	ESPN."	11	Tuttle,	Brad.	"Here’s	How	Much	Money	ABC	&	the	NBA	Make	with	an	NBA	Finals	Game	7"	
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hypothesis holds, then I would expect to see more fouls by the lagging team and less 
fouls by the leading team as the series spread increases. In the event of the referees 
favoring the lagging team I would expect to see little to no change in the proportion of 
foul calls on the lagging team while their overall aggressiveness increased throughout the 
series. This led me to my second hypothesis: 
 
While the aggressiveness of the lagging team increases and the aggressiveness 
of the leading team decreases, I expect to observe little to no change in the 
proportion of foul calls on the lagging team to the leading team due to a 
referee bias towards the lagging team.  
 
 
 
Previous Literature 
 
When considering how to acquire the most informative literature for my study I 
chose to construct my search around two primary bases. The first assumption of my study 
is: as the distance between two tournament competitors increases the laggard will 
increase their effort and risk taking behavior, and the leader will decrease their effort and 
risk taking behavior. To support this assumption I present several studies concerning the 
complexities of effort and risk taking behavior put forth by competitors in a variety of 
tournament competition settings. The second notion of my study is the assumption of 
referee bias towards the laggard of the NBA Finals in an effort to increase revenues and 
the likelihood the finals end in game five, six, or seven. To establish an empirical 
approach to identifying referee biases I consider a multitude of studies aimed at 
ascertaining specific biases in sports officiating, and in particular NBA and NCAA 
basketball officiating.  
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 Economic literature investigating competitor behavior in tournament competition 
settings is far from limited. Cabral (2003) considers R&D investment in an infinite time 
horizon multi-period race where competitors are given the option to chose a low payoff, 
low variance technology or a high payoff, high variance technology. The study seeks to 
determine a player’s optimal strategy as a function of their relative positioning. Cabral 
asserts a firm’s payoff is a function of the quality difference between its product and the 
rival’s, so payoffs are monotonic and symmetric, just as they are in the NBA Finals. 
Based on the results Cabral concludes in equilibrium the leader will most often chose the 
safer strategy, and the laggard the more risky strategy. Although he uses an infinite time 
horizon, Cabral concurs a similar result would be derived from a finite tournament 
structure “…thus formalizing the sports intuition that the laggard has nothing to lose.” 
Similarly to Cabral’s study, Ozbeklik and Smith (2014) examine risk-taking 
behavior in tournament competition through the lens of professional golf. The study aims 
to measure risk taking in one-on-one, single elimination golf tournaments using data 
taken from 579 professional golf matches and over 18,000 holes from 2003 to 2013. To 
assign a measure of risk-taking the authors use two approaches. First, they observe the 
percentage of holes conceded. This statistic offers insight into the holes where contestants 
took a risk and were unsuccessful. Second, they consider the standard deviation of 
relative-to-par scores of a hole over the course of the competition. Measuring the 
standard deviation of relative-to-par scores allows the researchers to identify holes with a 
high score variance, therefore, implying the larger the variance of a hole the more risk 
taken on that particular hole. Using both approaches Ozbeklik and Smith find players 
who were ahead adopted more conservative play, and players who were lagging adopted 
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more risky behavior. This finding was emphasized as the players came closer to the end 
of the tournament, and also as the difference between the two players scores increased.  
Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2009) test how particular tournament features 
affect contestant incentives and efforts over the course of the tournament. Specifically, 
the study considers a multi-period sales contest organized by a manufacturer amongst its 
retailers to observe how participant’s incentives evolve as the contest progresses. The 
contest provides a static environment in which homogeneous competitors reach a 
symmetric equilibrium, however, introducing the multi-period structure generates 
heterogeneity amidst the competitors due to the interim performance of each competitor. 
Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez find the introduction of the contest significantly impacts 
retailer’s efforts and incentivizes them to sell more goods. Additionally, they also observe 
a significant decrease in the efforts of leading competitors as well as an increase in the 
efforts of the lagging competitors to try to catch up. These tendencies increase as the 
distance between the competitors grows. However, as the gap grows to be too large to 
make up the researchers witness a decrease in motivation and effort by the lagging 
players, although, this finding is most likely irrelevant in a seven game series.  
In addition to the previously referenced studies on risk-taking behavior, Genakos 
and Pagliero (2012) consider the effects of interim rank on weight announcements in 
professional weightlifting. The study uses panel data from the Olympics and the World 
and European Weightlifting Championships from 1990 to 2006. In weightlifting 
competitions competitors are scored off of the amount of weight successfully lifted. 
Therefore, higher weight announcements represent riskier behavior because they imply a 
larger difference in the case of success or failure. The study finds that competitors 
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lagging behind are more likely to make risky announcements than competitors who are in 
the lead. The evidence displays an inverted-U relationship with interim rank. 
Announcements increase from first to sixth place, but then fall and become equivalent to 
first place by the 17th rank. 
To attempt to measure risk-taking behavior in basketball I must first understand 
how certain factors contribute to a teams success or failure. Stern (1994) creates a 
Brownian Motion model to predict who will win an NBA basketball game as a function 
of time remaining in the game t ∈ (0,1), and the difference in score X(t). When observing 
data from 493 NBA games Stern finds home teams consistently outscore visiting teams 
by roughly 1.5 points in the end of the first, second and third quarters, but lose the 
majority of the lead in the fourth quarter. The authors attributed this to coaching 
decisions to remove top players towards the end of the game because of their lead. This 
finding led me to consider not only the player’s risk-taking behavior during a game, but 
also the coach’s risk-taking behavior. I elaborate on this finding in the Methods section 
later in this paper. 
Zak, Huang and Siegfried (1979) similarly attempt to create a production function 
for an NBA team; however, they do so using a Cobb-Douglas production function. The 
researchers use data from 375 games over the 1976-77 NBA season. In regard to personal 
fouls the study finds a 1% increase in the ratio of personal fouls in the game leads to 
a .11% decrease in the point ratio between the teams. Additionally, when considering the 
possibility of a home court advantage the study finds teams perform better at home 
opposed to on the road, specifically in shooting accuracy and number of rebounds. The 
study does not find any correlation of on-the-road point deficit and officiating. 
	
 
12	
In conflict with Zak, Huang and Siegfried’s finding, Lehman and Reifman (1987) 
observe a difference in home vs. away officiating, but only with star players. The 
researchers hypothesize star players are less likely to have a foul called at home rather 
than away because fans are biased towards their favorite players. The study measures the 
difference between foul calls on star players12 at home and away, and non-star players at 
home and away. Leman and Reifman find star players are less likely to be called for fouls 
at home than away, this is significant at the 5% level. Additionally, the study also finds 
non-star players are just as likely to be called for a foul at home as they are on the road. 
These findings, in contradiction to the study done by Huang and Siegfried, imply there is 
a home court advantage in game officiating. 
Officiating biases can favor one specific team, or both teams simultaneously. 
Anderson and Pierce (2009) examine patterns in foul calls during 365 NCAA basketball 
games throughout the 2004-2005 season. They estimate expected foul differential based 
on a binomial distribution. The researchers then compare the expected foul differential 
with the empirical and find the actual variance is significantly less than the expected 
variance, therefore, suggesting the foul calls are not independent. Anderson and Pierce 
find fouls are more likely to be called on: the team with the fewest fouls, the visitor, and 
the leading team. The data suggests the probability of the next foul being called on the 
visitor can reach .7 in specific conditions due to the observed biases. Secondly, the study 
maps the probability of the next foul being called on the home team based on the current 
foul differential. They find referees consistently favor the home team as indicated by the 
equilibrium probability of .438. One key distinction of this study is they only compare 																																																								12	Star players are identified by all-star status, draft rank, and scoring status	
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fouls called in the first half of the game to control for fouls called in the last few minutes 
of the game, assuming they are intentional. 
Foul calls, as explained previously, can have a large impact of the outcome of a 
game. If the officials of a game are biased this can cause a game to transpire unnaturally, 
and in some cases profitably. Price et al. (2012) and Thu et al. (2002) identify officiating 
biases and explain how they relate to league profitability. Price et al. (2012) distinguish 
between discretionary turnovers13 and nondiscretionary turnovers14 to identify a referee 
bias. They also consider fouls called by the referees. The researchers track the difference 
between both types of turnovers over varying game situations to discern between 
differences in play by the players and referee bias. When tracking the DTO and NTO the 
study finds refs favor home teams, teams that are lagging in a game, and teams that are 
lagging in a series. While NTO remained relatively constant over different game 
scenarios, the study finds DTOs are called more often on the disadvantaged team. While 
the study does consider shooting fouls vs. non-shooting fouls, the results are not 
significant and provide little insight. The researchers also consider the profit benefits to 
referee bias and find all biases are profitable to the NBA. In conjunction, the study finds 
referees who work playoff games were more likely to be assigned to games where a weak 
home team was playing a strong visitor, “…this indicates the league makes ref 
assignments in a strategic way, and rewards refs who help teams when they need it most.”  
Thu et al. (2002) aim to identify two systematic biases of NCAA Division 1 
referees: if referees call a disproportionate amount of fouls on the leading team, and if the 
disproportionality of fouls called increases with nationally televised games. In the initial 																																																								13	DTO - call made by the referee	14	NTO - call made obvious by the players, out of bounds etc.	
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observation the researchers find foul calls in the last two minutes differ vastly from the 
rest of the game because the losing team typically intentionally fouls the winning team as 
the game comes to an end.15 To control for this the researchers leave all fouls called in 
the last two minutes out of their analysis. After controlling for fouls called in the last two 
minutes the researchers find on average leading teams have 6% more fouls called on 
them, this in significant to the 1% level. Additionally, the researchers also find NCAA 
Division 1 games that are televised on primary networks have a significant increase in 
fouls called against the leading team opposed to games that are not televised or televised 
on local channels, this is significant to the 1% level also. 
To summarize, the notion that as the distance between two tournament 
competitors increases the laggard is more likely to increase their effort and risky behavior 
and the leader in more likely to decrease their effort and risky behavior, is widely 
supported by tournament theory literature. Whether or not this increase or decrease is 
distinctly effort or distinctly risk remains more vague, but for the purpose of my study is 
obsolete. In regard to my second assumption, it can be determined officiating biases exist 
in sporting events and quite possibly the NBA. Whether these biases are a direct result of 
profit seeking stands unclear, however, the financial benefits to a referee bias in the NBA 
are explainable and quite plausibly a motivator for the bias I expect to observe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								15	Equal distribution of foul calls over entire game vs. 32%-66% laggard-leader in the last two minutes	
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Data 
 
 I gather all of my data on individual National Basketball Association (NBA) 
Finals games using Basketball Reference, a comprehensive statistical database containing 
NBA game summary statistics dating back to 1946. My data includes 91 individual 
games played in the 2001 to 2016 NBA Finals. Over the course of the fifteen years I 
collect data on, twelve individual teams appear in the NBA Championship, with nine 
emerging victorious.  
 For each individual game I record: the fouls, field goal attempts, three point 
attempts, steals, blocks, offensive rebounds, defensive rebounds, and starter to bench 
playtime ratio for each team competing in the series. To account for changes in play or 
tournament structure I also collect and include in my analysis: the year of the series and 
which team is playing at home. For the purpose of controlling for intentional fouls made 
in the last two minutes, I use play-by-play data and deduct all fouls made in the last two 
minutes. Due to the NBA not beginning to keep play-by-play statistics until the 2000-
2001 season, my data is limited to the fifteen Finals series I include.   
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Methods & Regressions 
 
To test my hypotheses I aim measure the aggressiveness of each team playing, as 
well as identify referee bias based on the existing series score.  
Measurements of Aggressiveness 
 
Field Goal Attempts to Three Point Attempts 
 
 For my first measure of aggressiveness I calculate each team’s field goal attempts 
to three-point attempts. In basketball there are three ways to gain points: free throw, field 
goal, and three-point shot. Each method delivers one, two, and three points respectively. 
As determined by Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2009) and Genakos and Pagliero 
(2012) risk-taking is often exhibited through the decision to take on a high variance, high 
payout option opposed to a low variance, low payout option. During the 2016 NBA 
season the success percentages for free throws, field goals, and three point shots are 77%, 
48%, and 36% respectively.16 Therefore, because three-point shots have the lowest 
success percentage and the highest payout, one can assume teams exhibiting risky and 
aggressive behavior will take more three-point shots than their counterparts. The ratio of 
FGA/TPA allows for me to determine when teams are playing more conservatively, i.e. 
taking easier shots with a higher success percentage, and when they are playing more 
aggressively, i.e. taking more risky shots. 
Steals 
 
 In basketball a player can attempt to steal the ball from the opposing player, 
however, this has a high likelihood of resulting in move past the aggressing player by the 
																																																								16	Gracenote. Basketball Reference, 2016 regular season stats 	
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ball handler. In that case the ball handler becomes goal-side of the aggressor, and he is 
able to freely take a shot or pass the ball. Because of this, attempting to steal the ball is a 
gamble. If the aggressor is able to get the ball they are often rewarded with an easy layup 
or assist, but if they fail to do so they let down their team and provide the opposing team 
with an easier attempt on goal. By including the steals of each team throughout the NBA 
Finals I am able to again measure each teams risk-taking behavior and aggressiveness.  
Blocks 
 I also include blocks in my measurement of team aggressiveness. A block results 
in a similar outcome to a steal. When blocking the aggressor attempts to swipe the ball 
from the opposing players hands as they go for a shot. If the ball handler pump-fakes 
when the aggressor attempts to block, the ball handler can easily step to the side of the 
aggressor and take an unguarded shot. Therefore, a block can result in a defended shot 
and often a turnover for the aggressing team, but if the attempt goes wrong the ball 
handler gets a free shot.  
Offensive & Defensive Rebounds 
 In Zak, Huang and Siegfried’s (1979) study of NBA team production efficiency 
the authors find offensive and defensive rebounds to be statistically significant in 
determining a teams win potential. After an unsuccessful shot on goal the ball is free and 
in play so as long as it stays in bounds. This means teams who are willing to box out 
harder, jump higher, and move faster to the ball will prevail. Therefore, offensive and 
defensive rebounds are a direct measure of team aggressiveness throughout a game. 
Starter Playtime vs. Bench Playtime 
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 Stern (1994) introduces the idea that coaching decisions are one of the primary 
factors effecting game outcomes. This assertion led me to consider the coach’s risk taking 
behavior and what affect it might have on foul calls. To measure coaches’ risk-taking 
behavior I include the ratio of starter playtime to bench playtime for each game. When a 
coach plays a star player he runs the risk of injuring or tiring out his player. Therefore, in 
low-risk situations a coach would be more inclined to allow their star players to rest, and 
play their bench players. However, in high-risk situations one would expect a coach to 
take the risk of injuring or tiring out their star players, and play them to the end of the 
game. For this reason I include the ratio of starter playtime to bench playtime to account 
the coach’s propensity to take risks.  
 Measuring Aggressiveness 
 To measure the aggressiveness of each team competing in the championship I use 
a stacked line chart to compare the difference of the leader from the laggard for each 
aggressiveness measure. In every possible series score scenario, i.e. (0,0), (0,1), (0,2), 
(1,1) etc. I calculate the average of each aggressiveness measurement and subtract the 
laggard average from the leader average. That is, I calculate the average steals for the 
leading team and the average steals for the lagging team in all (0,0) scenarios, then I 
subtract the lagging average from the leading average.  
 Because the measures are all on different scales I use the stacked line chart to 
identify trends in team play as the series progresses. To compare varying scenarios I list 
the series scores in order of equal to most unequal, i.e. starting with (0,0) where one 
would expect to see an even amount of aggressiveness by each team, and end with (0,3) 
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where one would expect to see the most aggressiveness by the lagging team and the least 
aggressiveness by the leading team.  
Identifying Referee Bias  
 To identify a referee bias towards the laggard I use a multiple-linear regression 
and control for series score, as well as the aggressiveness measures listed above. The 
regression I use is as follows: 
Fouls = 𝛼 + 𝛽1Fouls on Op. Team ∗ ZeroZero + 𝛽2Fouls on Op. 
Team ∗ ZeroOne + 𝛽3Fouls on Op. Team ∗ OneZero + 𝛽4Fouls on 
Op. Team ∗ ZeroTwo + 𝛽5Fouls on Op. Team ∗ TwoZero + 
𝛽6Fouls on Op. Team ∗ OneOne + 𝛽7Fouls on Op. Team ∗ 
ZeroThree + 𝛽8Fouls on Op. Team ∗ ThreeZero + 𝛽9Fouls on Op. 
Team ∗ TwoOne + 𝛽10Fouls on Op. Team ∗ OneTwo + 𝛽11Fouls 
on Op. Team ∗ OneThree + 𝛽12Fouls on Op. Team ∗ ThreeOne + 
𝛽13Fouls on Op. Team ∗ TwoTwo + 𝛽14Fouls on Op. Team ∗ 
TwoThree + 𝛽15Fouls on Op. Team ∗ ThreeTwo + 𝛽16Fouls on Op. 
Team ∗ ThreeThree + 𝛽17Steals + 𝛽18Blocks + 𝛽19Offensive 
Rebounds + 𝛽20Defensive Rebounds + 𝛽21Field Goal 
Attempts/Three-Point Attempts + 𝛽22Starter/Bench Playtime + 
𝛽23Game Time+ 𝛽24At Home + 𝛽25Year 
My regression consists of 182 observations due to the fact I consider fouls on both 
teams from all 91 game observations.  
Originally, I attempted to observe a referee bias in a foul ratio, which consisted of 
the fouls on the leading team over the fouls on the lagging team. I anticipated that while 
the series progressed I would see the aggressiveness of the lagging team increase and the 
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aggressiveness of the leading team decrease. If this was in fact true, then one would 
expect to observe a decrease in the foul ratio as stated above. 
Unfortunately, when I ran my first regression I realized I had no measure for the 
change in foul ratio I expected to see. I could observe a change as the series progressed, 
but I had no concept of if that change was large or small. Because of this, I needed to 
alter my regression to show foul calling variation in each series scenario opposed to the 
other scenarios. To identify any variation in calls dependent on the series score I chose to 
look at the number of fouls called on both teams throughout the series. 
 In my regression I regress the number of fouls on the opposing team multiplied by 
a dummy variable for the series score at the time of the game. I also include controls for 
the aggressiveness of the team whose fouls I am measuring to account for changes in play 
throughout the series. My regression ultimately measures what affect fouls on the 
opposing team have on the probability of having an additional foul called on the team in 
question. Although this regression is unable to identify a bias towards the laggard, it does 
have the ability to shed light on the effect of a foul call on the opposing team on fouls 
called on the team in question depending on the series scenario. 
Regression Variables 
 The dataset I run my regression on is setup with two observations of each game. 
Fouls, the dependent variable in my regression, represents the number of fouls called on 
team A in game X. Fouls on Op. Team represents the fouls called on team B in game X. 
The Fouls on Op. Team is multiplied by a dummy variable relating to the series score at 
the time of the game. For irrelevant series score variables the Fouls on Op. Team is 
multiplied by zero, and for the relevant series score I multiply the number of fouls by one. 
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The coefficients on each of the series score variables can be interpreted as the effect a 
foul on the opposing team has on the probability of an additional foul called on the team 
in question depending on the current series score. Although this does not help to identify 
laggard referee bias, it does help to identify game situations in which the referees are 
systematically keeping the game close, as well as game situations where the foul calls are 
independent from each other.  
 To control for changes in play by teams over the course of the series I include all 
of the aggressiveness measures I mention above. Steals represents the number of steals 
called on team A when regressing on the fouls called on team A. Blocks represents the 
number of blocks by team A. Offensive Rebounds and Defensive Rebounds represent the 
number of offensive and defensive rebounds by team A respectively. Field Goal 
Attempts/Three-Point Attempts is the ratio of team A’s field goal attempts over the 
number of team A’s three-point attempts during the game in question. Starter/Bench 
Playtime represents the total starter minutes of play over the total bench minutes of play 
for team A. Game Time represents the total playtime of the game; this allows me to 
control for games that went into overtime. At Home is a binary variable, which controls 
for whether or not the teams were playing at home. Lastly, I control for changes to 
tournament structure and play by including the Year of the series.  
 Each iteration of the regression represents the above variables for team A or team 
B respectively. As mentioned previously, I control for intentional fouls called in the last 
two minutes of each game by subtracting out all fouls called in the last two minutes. I 
include overtime in the overall game time, therefore in games that went to overtime I 
simply subtract out fouls from the last two minutes of overtime.  
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Results 
 
 To analyze the change in aggressiveness of the leading and lagging teams 
throughout the NBA finals I use a stacked line chart to measure the overall trends in team 
aggressiveness. For each series scenario I find the average: fouls, field goal 
attempts/three-point attempts, steals, blocks, offensive rebounds, defensive rebounds, and 
starter/bench playtime for both the leading and the lagging team. Then I take the averages 
and find the difference in aggressiveness between the leading and the lagging team in 
each series scenario. These differences are then mapped using a stacked line chart to 
display the overall difference in aggressiveness between the leaders and the laggards, 
refer to Figure 8.  
 When mapped together using a stacked line chart one observes an initial uptick in 
aggressiveness by the leading team in situations with a series score of (1,1), (2,2), and 
(3,3). As the series spread increases one observes a shift in the difference in 
aggressiveness resulting in a negative difference between the leader and the laggard. This 
is consistent with my initial hypothesis: as the series spread increases one expects to see a 
decrease in the aggressiveness of the leading team, and an increase in aggressiveness by 
the lagging team.   
 In concern with team aggressiveness, my regression model does not display any 
statistically significant observations. However, in regard to the correlation between a foul 
being called on the other team and receiving a foul, I find multiple statistically significant 
observations. In all series score scenarios, aside from Three Zero for which I had limited 
observations, one observes a positive correlation between a foul being called on the 
opposing team, and a foul being called on the team in question. Although not all 
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coefficients are statistically significant, one observes a consistent increase in correlation 
as the series spread increases. This can be interpreted as an observable trend in the 
referees keeping the game closer through dependent foul calls in games with a larger 
series spread, while calling fouls more independently in games with little to no series 
spread. This does not confirm nor deny any bias in the referee’s calls towards the leader 
or the laggard, but it does establish an observable increase in dependency on foul calls on 
the opposing team with an increase in series spread when measuring the potential for an 
additional foul call on the team in question.  
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 This paper examines a referee’s propensity to make foul calls on the leading team 
of the NBA Finals due to a proposed increase in league revenue incentives during the 
finals. The data consists of NBA Finals played over 15 years, in which 91 individual 
games were played between 12 teams. As proposed in my hypothesis, I observe an 
increase in the aggressiveness of the lagging team as the series spread increases, as well 
as a decrease in the aggressiveness of the leading team. This is in line with the theory that 
in a finite time horizon multiple-period contest, the laggard will increase their risk taking 
behavior and effort as long as they have nothing more to lose.  
Although I attempt to capture a referee bias towards the laggard, I am unable to 
do so due to a lack of measure for the observable change in foul calls. However, my 
regression results do point to various significant referee biases in the NBA Finals. First 
off, I observe a trend in referee’s propensity to make foul calls dependent on an 
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additional foul call on the opposing team. This dependency increases as the series spread 
increases, implying the referees are systematically keeping the games closer by way of 
foul calls in games with a high series score differential. This result is far from surprising. 
One might expect the referees to make calls more independently when there is no leader 
of the series, and to keep the game close as the potential for a series winner increases.  
Additionally, when including the At Home variable I observe a significant 
decrease in the total number of fouls called on the team in question. This finding is also 
supported by previous literature as other studies have found a home court advantage 
when investigating the NBA and NCAA. This finding again is far from surprising. One 
expects referees to favor the home team due to an implicit bias as well as fan biases 
towards their team during the game.  
One surprising finding of my study is the negative correlation of Starter/Bench 
Playtime to Fouls. I originally included Starter/Bench Playtime to measure the 
aggressiveness of the coaches. I expected to see a positive correlation with fouls received 
and the playtime ratio, however, I observe a negative coefficient in my regression. In 
previous studies17 researchers have found that referees are less likely to make foul calls 
on star players, especially at home, because the fans disapprove. This theory is a possible 
explanation for why I observe a negative coefficient for Starter/Bench Playtime. Star 
players are most likely to be starters. As coaches play more aggressively and use their 
starters more, the referees may make less total foul calls because they are less inclined to 
make calls on star players and increase the potential of them being forced out of the game.  
																																																								17	Lehman and Reifman (1987)	
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If one is looking to expand on this study in the future I highly recommend 
approaching the problem from the beginning with an appropriate measure for the 
difference in foul calling. I was unable to achieve my goal of identifying a referee bias 
towards the laggard, however, I am still unconvinced it does not exist. Because I was 
unable to measure to what degree the foul calls were changing in conjunction with a 
change in aggressiveness of the two teams, I was prevented from making any significant 
findings regarding a laggard bias. Had I had more time I would have completed a similar 
study on the regular season. Had I done this I would have been able to establish a 
standard for the correlation between the change in aggressiveness and the change in foul 
calls. Additionally, I would include more measures for variation in team play. Originally, 
I collected all the regular season averages for the statistics included in my analysis to 
control for variation in team steals, starter/bench playtime, blocks, etc., but I chose to 
exclude the data from my study due to possible variation in regular season play opposed 
to Finals play. If I had completed the same study for the regular season, then I would 
have been able to account for possible variation in play between the regular season and 
the finals. 
My study adds to existing literature pertaining to officiating baises in the NBA 
Finals as well as supports past claims made by previous researchers. Although I did not 
achieve my goal of proving both of my hypotheses correct, I found my first hypothesis 
regarding team aggressiveness to be true, and I stumbled upon a few findings that in 
general support my overall hypothesis that the NBA Finals are subject to referee bias in 
line with extending the potential length of the series. It is my hope these finding will be 
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expanded upon, and that someday someone is able to identify the bias I still strongly 
believe is present.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Difference in Means - Fouls 
 
Series 
Score Leader Avg. Fouls Laggard Avg. Fouls Difference T-Stat 
(0,0) 18.06 20.57 -2.5 -1.68 
(1,1) 23.25 17.88 5.36 2.99 
(2,2) 25.71 21.28 4.42 2.01 
(3,3) 19.5 18 1.5 0.74 
(0,1) 20.56 22.25 -1.68 -1.21 
(1,2) 20.71 21.85 -1.14 -0.82 
(2,3) 20.88 21.11 -0.22 -0.10 
(0,2) 22 20.42 1.57 0.75 
(1,3) 21.85 24.42 -2.57 -1.35 
(0,3) 15.5 19.5 -4 -1.56 
Overall 20.8 20.728 0.074 0.12 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Difference in Means - Field Goal Attempts to Three Point Attempts 
 
Series 
Score 
Leader Avg. Field 
Goal Attempts/Three 
Point Attempts 
Laggard Avg. Field 
Goal Attempts/Three 
Point Attempts 
Difference T-Stat 
(0,0) 5.25 5.2 0.06 0.07 
(1,1) 4.5 4.49 0.01 0.01 
(2,2) 4.32 4.72 -0.4 -0.37 
(3,3) 3.73 4.33 -0.6 -0.58 
(0,1) 3.92 4.99 -1.06 -1.46 
(1,2) 3.91 5.65 -1.74 -2.03 
(2,3) 3.49 3.66 -0.16 -0.37 
(0,2) 3.82 5.1 -1.28 -2.41 
(1,3) 3.73 3.75 -0.01 -0.01 
(0,3) 3.66 7.02 -3.36 -1.04 
Overall 4.033 4.891 -0.85 -3.01 
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Figure 3: Difference in Means - Steals 
 
Series 
Score Leader Avg. Steals Laggard Avg. Steals Difference T-Stat 
(0,0) 6.88 8.31 -1.44 -1.57 
(1,1) 7.89 7.67 0.22 0.14 
(2,2) 6.43 7.43 -1 -0.82 
(3,3) 6.5 8.25 -1.75 -1.11 
(0,1) 8 7.63 0.38 0.36 
(1,2) 6.21 7.36 -1.14 -1.06 
(2,3) 8.56 8.33 0.22 0.11 
(0,2) 7 8.57 -1.57 1.26 
(1,3) 6.43 8 -1.57 -1.47 
(0,3) 6 5 1 1.00 
Overall 6.99 7.655 -0.67 -1.63 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Difference in Means - Blocks 
 
Series 
Score Leader Avg. Blocks Laggard Avg. Blocks Difference T-Stat 
(0,0) 5.5 4.63 0.88 0.91 
(1,1) 6.33 4.78 1.56 1.61 
(2,2) 3.67 6.33 -2.67 -1.52 
(3,3) 4.75 5.5 -0.75 -0.61 
(0,1) 6.38 4 2.38 2.37 
(1,2) 4.64 4.71 -0.07 -0.05 
(2,3) 4.78 6.38 -1.6 -0.99 
(0,2) 4.57 4.86 -0.29 -0.18 
(1,3) 6 4.57 1.43 0.91 
(0,3) 2.5 3 -0.5 -0.44 
Overall 4.912 4.876 0.037 0.09 
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Figure 5: Difference in Means - Offensive Rebounds 
 
Series 
Score 
Leader Avg. 
Offensive Rebounds 
Laggard Avg. 
Offensive Rebounds Difference T-Stat 
(0,0) 11.75 10.31 1.44 1.09 
(1,1) 9.89 11.78 -1.89 -0.97 
(2,2) 12.29 9.43 2.86 1.16 
(3,3) 12.25 9.25 3 0.78 
(0,1) 11.06 11.94 -0.88 -0.67 
(1,2) 11.5 10.21 1.29 0.78 
(2,3) 11.22 10.67 0.56 0.33 
(0,2) 9.14 12 -2.86 -1.23 
(1,3) 12.14 10.43 1.71 0.65 
(0,3) 9 13 -4 -1.78 
Overall 11.02 10.902 0.123 0.21 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Difference in Means - Defensive Rebounds 
 
Series 
Score 
Leader Avg. 
Defensive Rebounds 
Laggard Avg. 
Defensive Rebounds Difference T-Stat 
(0,0) 33.19 28.06 5.13 3.63 
(1,1) 28.44 30.11 -1.67 -0.89 
(2,2) 26.71 26.43 0.29 0.12 
(3,3) 31 32 -1 -0.36 
(0,1) 29.88 29.25 0.63 0.39 
(1,2) 30.64 30.79 -0.14 -0.08 
(2,3) 33.22 32.44 0.78 0.28 
(0,2) 27.43 29.86 -2.43 -0.78 
(1,3) 31.43 30 1.43 0.71 
(0,3) 33 28.5 4.5 2.49 
Overall 30.49 29.744 0.752 1.09 
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Figure 7: Difference in Means – Starter to Bench Playtime 
 
Series 
Score 
Leader Avg. 
Starter/Bench 
Playtime 
Laggard Avg. 
Starter/Bench 
Playtime 
Difference T-Stat 
(0,0) 2.51 2.78 -0.26 -0.83 
(1,1) 2.15 3 -0.85 -2.12 
(2,2) 2.89 3.41 -0.52 -0.82 
(3,3) 2.71 4.86 -2.16 -2.90 
(0,1) 2.5 2.44 0.06 0.17 
(1,2) 2.7 2.43 0.27 0.83 
(2,3) 2.48 2.7 -0.22 -0.58 
(0,2) 2.28 3 -0.72 -1.65 
(1,3) 2.55 2.65 -0.11 -0.24 
(0,3) 3.47 2.08 1.39 0.99 
Overall 2.624 2.935 -0.31 -0.76 
 
 
Figure 8: Stacked Line Chart – Combined Difference in Means 
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Figure 9: Regression Summary 
 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std. Error 95% Conf. Interval 
Series Score: (0,0) 0.104 [.106] -.105       to        .313 
Series Score: (0,1) 0.128 [.119] -.107       to        .363 
Series Score: (1,0) 0.200** [.093] .016        to        .384 
Series Score: (0,2) No Data   
Series Score: (2,0) 0.200** [.091] .019        to        .380 
Series Score: (1,1) 0.137 [.101] -.063       to        .338 
Series Score: (0,3) No Data   
Series Score: (3,0) -0.023 [.152] -.325       to        .277 
Series Score: (1,2) 0.177* [.095] -.010       to        .365 
Series Score: (2,1) 0.209* [.115] -.018       to        .437 
Series Score: (1,3) 0.281*** [.092] .099        to        .463 
Series Score: (3,1) 0.266*** [.103] .062        to        .470 
Series Score: (2,2) 0.247*** [.094] .061        to        .433 
Series Score: (2,3) 0.148 [.123] -.096       to        .392 
Series Score: (3,2) 0.228** [.104] .022        to        .434 
Series Score: (3,3) 0.139 [.118] -.094       to        .372 
Steals 0.126 [.098] -.068       to        .321 
Blocks -0.15 [.118] -.383       to        .083 
Offensive Rebounds -0.001 [.071] -.140       to        .139 
Defensive Rebounds -0.058 [.080] -.218       to        .101 
FGA/TPA 0.289** [.148] -.003       to        .583 
Starter/Bench Playtime -0.516* [.307] -1.122     to        .090 
Game Time 0.079* [.045] -.011       to        .170 
At Home -1.762*** [.580] -2.909     to      -.614 
Year -0.114 [.089] -.289       to        .061 
All values statistically significant at the: *10%, **5%, & ***1% levels. 
Number of observations: n = 182  
R2 = .274 
Fouls represents the number of fouls called on team A in game X. Fouls on Op. Team represents 
the fouls called on team B in game X. Fouls on Op. Team is multiplied by a dummy variable 
relating to the series score at the time of the game. The coefficients on each of the series score 
variables can be interpreted as the effect a foul on the opposing team has on the probability of an 
additional foul called on the team in question depending on the current series score. Steals 
represents the number of steals called on team A. Blocks represents the number of blocks by team 
A. Offensive Rebounds and Defensive Rebounds represent the number of offensive and defensive 
rebounds by team A. Field Goal Attempts/Three-Point Attempts is the ratio of team A’s field goal 
attempts over the number of team A’s three-point attempts. Starter/Bench Playtime represents the 
total starter minutes of play over the total bench minutes of play for team A. Game Time 
represents the total playtime of the game. At Home controls for whether or not the team is playing 
at home. Year controls for the year of the series.  
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Figure 10: NBA League Revenue by Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Average Viewership of NBA Finals Games by Year 
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